Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

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41 Scopus citations

Abstract

Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this article, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9325938
Pages (from-to)7412-7422
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Volume17
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2005-2012 IEEE.

Keywords

  • Cyber-physical systems (CPSs)
  • Real-time attack detection
  • Resilience
  • Software-defined networking (SDN)

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