A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments

Anaheed Ayoub; Baek Gyu Kim; Insup Lee; Oleg Sokolsky

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments

Anaheed Ayoub
, Baek Gyu Kim
, Insup Lee
, Oleg Sokolsky

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

University of Pennsylvania

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered acceptable, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confidence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is described and illustrated with a running example.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings
Pages	305-316
Number of pages	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26
State	Published - 2012
Event	31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2012 - Magdeburg, Germany Duration: 25 Sep 2012 → 28 Sep 2012

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7612 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2012
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Magdeburg
Period	25/09/12 → 28/09/12

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work is supported in part by the NSF CPS grant CNS-1035715 and the NSF/FDA Scholar-in-Residence grant CNS-1042829.

Keywords

assurance deficits
confidence arguments
safety cases

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

Cite this

Ayoub, A., Kim, B. G., Lee, I., & Sokolsky, O. (2012). A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. In Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings (pp. 305-316). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7612 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

Ayoub, Anaheed ; Kim, Baek Gyu ; Lee, Insup et al. / A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings. 2012. pp. 305-316 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments",

abstract = "Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered acceptable, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confidence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is described and illustrated with a running example.",

keywords = "assurance deficits, confidence arguments, safety cases",

author = "Anaheed Ayoub and Kim, \{Baek Gyu\} and Insup Lee and Oleg Sokolsky",

note = "Funding Information: This work is supported in part by the NSF CPS grant CNS-1035715 and the NSF/FDA Scholar-in-Residence grant CNS-1042829.; 31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2012 ; Conference date: 25-09-2012 Through 28-09-2012",

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doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2\_26",

language = "English",

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series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

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Ayoub, A, Kim, BG, Lee, I & Sokolsky, O 2012, A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. in Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7612 LNCS, pp. 305-316, 31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2012, Magdeburg, Germany, 25/09/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. / Ayoub, Anaheed; Kim, Baek Gyu; Lee, Insup et al.
Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings. 2012. p. 305-316 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7612 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Kim, Baek Gyu

AU - Lee, Insup

AU - Sokolsky, Oleg

N1 - Funding Information: This work is supported in part by the NSF CPS grant CNS-1035715 and the NSF/FDA Scholar-in-Residence grant CNS-1042829.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered acceptable, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confidence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is described and illustrated with a running example.

AB - Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered acceptable, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confidence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is described and illustrated with a running example.

KW - assurance deficits

KW - confidence arguments

KW - safety cases

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84867608947

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84867608947

SN - 9783642336775

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

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BT - Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings

T2 - 31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2012

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Ayoub A, Kim BG, Lee I, Sokolsky O. A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. In Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security - 31st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2012, Proceedings. 2012. p. 305-316. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_26

A systematic approach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments

Abstract

Publication series

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Bibliographical note

Keywords

Access to Document

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